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Abstract
Previous research has indicated that adults have a future-oriented cognitive bias, one illustration of which is their tendency 
to report more thoughts about the future than the past during mind-wandering. We examined whether children showed a 
similar bias, and whether there were any developmental changes in the magnitude of such a bias. Children aged 6–7 and 
9–10 years, adolescents, and adults completed two tasks in which they could report either past or future thoughts: a mind-
wandering task assessing spontaneous past and future thinking and a cued episodic thinking task in which they were free to 
describe either past or future events. Only adults showed a future-oriented bias in the mind-wandering task. Participants in 
all groups were much more likely to describe past events in the cue word task, and the proportion of future events described 
did not change developmentally. However, more than a third of the youngest age group produced no descriptions at all of 
future events, which was a significantly larger proportion than in any other age groups, and illustrates the difficulty that some 
children of this age have with future thinking. Our findings indicate that future-oriented bias and developmental changes in 
such bias may be task-specific.
Introduction
Research on thinking in adults has suggested that there is 
what has been termed a “future-oriented” or “prospective” 
bias (Grant & Walsh, 2016; Smallwood, Nind, & O’Connor, 
2009). Experience sampling techniques in the laboratory 
and in the context of daily life have indicated that adults 
typically report future-oriented thoughts more frequently 
than past-oriented thoughts (e.g., Grant & Walsh, 2016; 
Smallwood et al., 2009; Smallwood et al., 2011; Spronken, 
Holland, Figner, & Dijksterhuis, 2016; Stawarczyk, Cas-
sol, & D’Argembeau, 2013; Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maj, 
Van der Linden, & D’Argembeau, 2011; Song & Wang, 
2012). Adults attach greater value to future events than past 
events, feel greater emotions when considering future events 
compared to past events, and judge the future to feel closer 
than the past (Caouette, Wohl, & Peetz, 2012; Caruso, 2010, 
Caruso, Gilbert, & Wilson, 2008; Caruso, Van Boven, Chin, 
& Ward, 2013; Van Boven & Ashworth, 2007); such find-
ings can also be interpreted as evidence of a future-oriented 
bias in judgments and attitudes (Suhler & Callender, 2012; 
Sullivan, 2018).
Numerous authors have emphasized the adaptive nature 
of future-oriented cognition in allowing us to prepare for a 
future that is as yet undetermined, in comparison to merely 
dwelling on past events that cannot be changed (e.g., Parfit, 
1984; Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007; Suddendorf & 
Corballis, 2007; Suhler & Callender, 2012). On such an 
approach, a future-oriented bias can be seen as an evolu-
tionary adaptation. What is not clear, though, is the devel-
opmental origins of such a bias (though see Burns, McCor-
mack, Jaroslawska, Fitzpatrick, McGourty, & Caruso, 2018). 
In particular, very little is known about the salience of the 
future in the mental lives of children. Children begin to use 
and understand the future tense in language at the early 
stages of language acquisition (Harner, 1982; Weist, 1989), 
and research on the development of episodic future thinking 
suggests that when prompted, children can reliably begin 
to describe specific future events around 3–4 years of age 
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(Busby & Suddendorf, 2005; Hayne, Gross, McNamee, Fitz-
gibbon, & Tustin, 2011; Quon & Atance, 2010; Richmond 
& Pan, 2013). However, although it has been suggested that 
episodic future and past thinking develop in tandem in the 
preschool years (Busby & Suddendorf, 2005; Richmond & 
Pan, 2013), studies of middle childhood indicate that the 
ability to episodically remember the past develops more 
quickly than the ability to episodically imagine the future 
(Coughlin, Lyons, & Ghetti, 2014; Wang, Capous, Koh, & 
Hou, 2014). If children do have particular difficulty episod-
ically imaging the future, this might translate into future 
thoughts playing less of a role in their mental lives.
The aims of the current study are to examine whether 
children show future-oriented bias, as operationalized by a 
tendency to think about the future rather than the past, and 
whether there are developmental changes in the magnitude 
of such a bias across childhood, adolescence, and into adult-
hood. We measured the tendency to think about the future 
versus the past in two ways: using a mind-wandering task 
and a word-cueing task that prompted episodic thinking.
Mind‑wandering
Adult studies have examined spontaneous future and past 
thoughts using experience sampling methods, and in par-
ticular by looking at the temporal focus of mind-wander-
ing in laboratory-based testing (e.g., Baird, Smallwood, 
& Schooler, 2011; Smallwood et al., 2009, 2011). Given 
the educational significance of mind-wandering (Small-
wood, Fishman, & Schooler, 2007), it is perhaps surpris-
ing that there are extremely few developmental studies, and 
no existing data that we are aware of that examine whether 
there are developmental changes in the temporal focus of 
mind-wandering. In a recent developmental study, Van den 
Driessche et  al. (2017) examined mind-wandering (and 
relatedly, “mind-blanking”) in children of a mean age of 
8 years using a paradigm similar to that typically used with 
adults. The focus of their study was actually on the effects of 
ADHD, and they did not examine developmental change and 
also did not report the temporal focus of mind-wandering 
in their child samples. Stawarczyk, Majerus, Catale, and 
D’Argembeau (2014) compared levels of mind-wandering 
in adolescents and adults but did not ask participants to 
report whether mind-wandering was to the past or future. 
Two earlier studies of mind-wandering in late childhood, 
however, did report temporal focus. Zhang, Song, Ye, and 
Wang (2015) examined mind-wandering in 9- to 11-year-
olds who were performing a Go-NoGo task and found that 
children reported more future-oriented episodes of mind-
wandering than past-oriented episodes. In Ye, Song, Zhang, 
and Wang’s (2014) study, children aged 9–14 (mean age of 
11 years) reported on mind-wandering while performing a 
choice reaction time task or a 1-back working memory task. 
For both tasks, children reported thinking about the future 
around 25% of the time, whereas they reporting thinking 
about the past 11–14% of the time. The findings of both 
Ye, Song, Zhang, & Wang (2014) and Zhang et al.’s (2015) 
studies suggest that by late childhood, a future-oriented bias 
is apparent. However, developmental changes have not been 
examined, and it is not known if such a bias exists in younger 
children.
A number of findings suggest the hypothesis that the tem-
poral focus of mind-wandering may shift developmentally 
towards becoming more future-biased. First, developmen-
tal changes in executive functioning, which are well-doc-
umented to occur over a long developmental period (Best 
& Miller, 2010), might result in changes in temporal focus. 
Baird et al. (2011) found that adults with higher working 
memory capacity showed a greater future-oriented bias in 
mind-wandering (though see McVay, Unsworth, McMil-
lan, & Kane, 2013; Robison & Unsworth, 2017); moreo-
ver, increasing the demands of the primary task on working 
memory capacity reduces the future-oriented bias (Small-
wood et al., 2009, 2011). Both of these findings suggest that 
the future-oriented bias in mind-wandering may be linked 
to available working memory capacity, which in turn sug-
gests that as working memory capacity increases, a future-
oriented bias may emerge or become more pronounced.
Second, there is some evidence that brain regions which 
are known to develop across childhood and into adolescence 
(Blakemore & Choudhury, 2006; Hooper, Luciana, Conk-
lin, Yarger, 2004) are critical for the future-oriented bias in 
mind-wandering. Bertossi and Ciaramelli (2016) reported 
that patients with ventromedial prefrontal damage not only 
showed reduced overall levels of mind-wandering, but most 
strikingly, reported no future-oriented mind-wandering at 
all. These authors argue that this pattern stems from impair-
ments in episodic thinking (Bertossi, Tesini, Cappelli, & 
Ciaramelli, 2016) which may be particularly pronounced 
for episodic future thinking (Bertossi, Candela, Ciaramelli, 
& De Luca, 2017). Although it is difficult to straightfor-
wardly extrapolate developmental predictions from studies 
of neuropsychological patients, these findings indicate that 
the future-oriented bias in mind-wandering may depend on 
brain regions and associated cognitive functions that develop 
gradually.
In our study, we used a simplified mind-wandering 
paradigm in which participants reported when probed as 
to whether they were thinking about the past, present, or 
future while they completed another task. Because we were 
concerned about young children’s potential difficulties in 
reporting on mind-wandering while simultaneously complet-
ing a cognitively demanding task, and because we wanted 
to match task difficulty as closely as possible across age 
groups, we asked participants to do some coloring-in rather 
than the more standard type of cognitive task typically used 
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in mind-wandering studies with adults. They were then 
probed at intervals to report, by pressing one of three but-
tons on a touch-screen, whether they were thinking about the 
past, the here-and-now, or the future. We note that the “here-
and-now” category of response does not distinguish between 
whether children were thinking about the coloring-in task 
or other aspects of their present environment. However, we 
wanted to keep the response options simple for young chil-
dren, and our primary focus was on the relative proportions 
of past versus future responses.
Cued episodic thinking
Our participants also completed an episodic thinking task 
using a cue word technique. Cue word studies of episodic 
thinking and its development have been conducted previ-
ously (e.g., Coughlin et al., 2014; Quon & Atance, 2010); 
what was distinctive about our task was that participants 
were free to generate either a past or a future episode in 
response to the cue, whereas in previous studies, participants 
were explicitly directed to describe only either past or future 
events. We were interested in the relative proportions of past 
and future episodes that participants generated in response 
to the cues and specifically if these proportions changed 
developmentally. In addition, we asked for participants to 
make ratings about the clarity of the events in their minds, 
how quickly the event came to mind, and the valence of the 
event. For these additional measures, we were interested in 
past–future differences, and also whether these showed a 
developmental pattern.
To the best of our knowledge, this was the first study 
to examine cued episodic thinking in which participants 
were free to report either past or future event descriptions. 
However, there are some existing findings that make it 
possible to speculate on the likely temporal focus, and on 
past–future differences regarding the additional measures. 
With regard to the former issue, it might be predicted that 
temporal focus would not show future-oriented bias even 
in adults. In the context of mind-wandering, thoughts that 
are cued by environmental stimuli tend to be past- rather 
than future-oriented. Maillet and Schacter (2016) found 
that past rather than future thinking was more prevalent 
for episodes of mind-wandering that were triggered by pre-
sented stimuli, whereas this was not the case for thoughts 
unrelated to the stimuli. Similarly, Plimpton, Patel, and 
Kvavilashvili (2015) reported that mind-wandering was 
dominated by past-oriented thoughts under circumstances 
in which unrelated verbal cues appeared the screen (see 
also Vannucci, Pelagatti, & Marchetti, 2017). All these 
authors suggest that verbal cueing is more likely to trigger 
memory retrieval than future thinking. Studies of invol-
untary mental time travel, in which participants report 
when mental time travel to either the past or future occurs 
spontaneously also indicate the absence of a future-ori-
ented bias; in these studies, similar amounts of past and 
future thought occur (Berntsen, Rubin, & Salgado, 2015; 
Cole, Staugaard, & Berntsen, 2016; Finnbogadóttir & 
Berntsen, 2013).
Although our task was not a mind-wandering task, 
because participants were explicitly asked to generate event 
descriptions in response to word cues, these findings suggest 
that we are unlikely to find a future-oriented bias. Never-
theless, we thought it was possible that there would be a 
developmental shift in the relative proportions of past ver-
sus future event descriptions, with an age-related increase 
in future event descriptions. Such a prediction could be 
generated on the basis of previous findings indicating that 
children find episodic future thinking particularly difficult 
(Coughlin et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2014). It would be con-
sistent with suggestions that episodic future thinking is 
more cognitively effortful than episodically remembering 
because of its greater demands on constructive processes 
(Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007; D’Argembeau, Ortoleva, 
Jumentier, & van der Linden, 2010; Schacter & Addis, 2007; 
though see Anderson, Dewhurst, & Nash, 2012; Jeune-
homme & D’Argembeau, 2016). Thus, we speculated that 
the proportion of future events described might increase 
developmentally.
On the basis of previous findings, we were also able to 
make predictions about the other measures used in our task 
(clarity, how quickly the event came to mind, and valence). 
Studies with adults suggest that the rated clarity of remem-
bered events might be greater than imagined future events 
(Berntsen & Bohn, 2010; D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 
2004, D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2006; Gamboz, 
Brandimonte, & De Vito, 2010), and one might predict that 
such a past–future difference may be even more marked in 
children (although we note that Coughlin et al. 2014, did 
not report past–future differences in clarity in any of their 
age groups). In terms of self-reported speed at which the 
event came to mind, Coughlin et al. found that child groups 
reported that future events took longer to come to mind 
than past events, but this was not true for their adult group. 
Coughlin et al. speculate that children’s self-reports on this 
measure reflect their greater difficulties with generating 
future event descriptions compared to past event descrip-
tions, whereas adults do not struggle with future event gen-
eration to the same extent. We were interested in whether 
we could replicate Coughlin et al.’s developmental findings 
regarding self-reported speed at which an event came to 
mind in the context in which participants could freely choose 
to describe a past or a future event. One possibility is that 
past–future differences in speed may disappear even in chil-
dren under circumstances in which participants can describe 
whichever type of event comes to mind first.
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Finally, there is considerable evidence that suggests that 
imagined future events are more likely to be rated as hav-
ing positive valence than remembered events, both in situ-
ations in which thought about events at other times is cued 
and when it occurs spontaneously (Berntsen & Bohn, 2010; 
Berntsen & Jacobsen, 2008; Cole et al., 2016; Finnboga-
dóttir & Berntsen, 2013), i.e., that there is a marked future 
positivity bias (Cole et al., 2016). This is in line with a vari-
ety of findings that suggest that people have a tendency to 
assume that their future will be rosy (e.g., Newby-Clark & 
Ross, 2003; Ross & Newby-Clark, 1998). There is some 
evidence to suggest that even relatively young children tend 
to be (over) optimistic about their future over long-time 
scales (Bohn & Berntsen, 2013; Lockhart, Chang, & Story, 
2002), and in their developmental study of episodic think-
ing. Abram, Picard, Navarro, and Piolino (2014) found a 
future positivity bias that did not interact with age. Thus, we 
anticipated that the future positivity bias might be present in 
all of our age groups.
The current study
In the study to be described, we tested a notably wide age 
range of participants. There were two groups of children 
(aged 6–7 and 9–10), alongside an adolescent group (aged 
14–15) and an adult group. Use of these age groups allowed 
us to examine the development profile of spontaneous and 
cued past and future thinking in detail. In addition to the 
mind-wandering and word-cue tasks, participants com-
pleted a task assessing working memory capacity. The lat-
ter task was included because of previous suggestions that 
future-oriented thinking in mind-wandering may make more 
demands on working memory resources than past-oriented 
thinking (Baird et al., 2011) and that episodic future thinking 
may be more cognitively demanding than episodic remem-
bering (Addis et al., 2007; D’Argembeau et al., 2010). This 
allowed us to examine the role of working memory abilities 
in explaining any individual or group differences in future-
oriented bias.
Method
Participants
There were four groups of participants in the study: forty 
two 6- to 7-year-olds (Mage = 84 months; range = 69–96 
months, 24 females), thirty one 9- to 10-year-olds (Mage 
= 120 months; range = 108–139 months, 10 females), 
twenty three 14- to 15-year-olds (Mage = 14 years 3 months; 
range = 153–188 months, 12 females) and thirty-seven 
adults (Mage = 27 years 5 months; range = 18–63 years, 25 
females). All participants were tested in the developmental 
laboratory in the home department of the first author. Two 
participants from the youngest age group did not contribute 
data to the word cue task due to equipment error and experi-
menter error, respectively. One further participant from the 
youngest age group refused to give any responses during 
the digit span task. One participant each from the 14- to 
15-year-olds, and adult age groups did not contribute data 
to the mind-wandering data task due to equipment failure. 
Adult participants were primarily recruited through notices 
across the university, and were paid £15 (UK) for their par-
ticipation. Child and adolescent participants were primarily 
recruited by advertising in social media and through infor-
mation distributed in schools.
Materials
A touch-screen Dell Latitude laptop with a 12-inch screen 
was used to administer the tasks. In the word cue task, there 
were four different displays (see Fig. 1a-d). The first display 
(Fig. 1a) had two squares on the screen, one on the left for 
reporting past events (also described as something that has 
happened) and one on the right for reporting future events 
(described as something that will happen). The second dis-
play (Fig. 1b) was used to report how quickly the event came 
to mind using a three-point scale ranging from slow to fast. 
The square on the left had a picture of a tortoise beside 
it and the square on the right had a picture of a sprinting 
hare, representing “slow” and “fast”, respectively. The mid-
dle square had no picture beside it and was used to indicate 
that the event came to mind neither fast nor slow. The third 
display (Fig. 1c) was used to report how clearly participants 
imagined the event, and had six pictures of a character with 
a thought bubble. A picture of a scene in the bubble var-
ied systematically in how blurry it was. Finally, the fourth 
display (Fig. 1d) contained a horizontal row of seven faces 
varying from very sad to very happy to allow the participants 
to judge the valence of the event.
For the coloring-in task used in the mind-wandering 
paradigm, black-and-white printed sheets with a variety of 
pictures on them were used, along with a set of coloring 
pencils. The digit span task was taken from the WISC IV 
(Wechsler, 2004); we used this version even with the adult 
sample because we wanted to be able to look at the relation 
between raw scores and performance on the other tasks (e.g., 
to examine whether age effects might be explicable in terms 
of WM) and we would have had to use standardized rather 
than raw scores if adults had been given a different version 
of the digit span task. We note that adults were not at ceiling 
in the task (and indeed their overall mean score was slightly 
lower than that of the adolescents). A digital audio recorder 
was used to record responses in the word cue task.
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Procedure
Participants completed the three tasks in this study as part of 
a longer testing session lasting around 80 min. Participants 
completed three tasks in the following order: the word cue 
task, the mind-wandering task, and the digit span task. In 
between completing the word cue task and the mind-wander-
ing task, participants completed another exercise that is not 
reported here in which they made speeded judgments about 
whether sentences were past or future tensed; this task took 
around 10 min.
Word cue task
Child participants but not adolescents or adults participated 
in an initial training involving the emotion scale; this was 
due to previous work in our lab indicating that in the absence 
of such training, children primarily use the extreme ends 
of emotion scales. Children were introduced to the scale 
and the faces on the scale were described as varying from 
“really really sad” to “really really happy”. Children were 
initially asked to point to the face that matched each of seven 
descriptions. They were then given a set of five cards depict-
ing events of differing valence (e.g., being caught in the rain 
without a coat, winning a prize), and asked to try to match 
them to specific faces. This was to encourage them to use 
faces that were not at the ends of the scale. After completing 
the pre-training, participants began the word cue task.
Participants were introduced to the word cue task by the 
experimenter explaining that they would see some words on 
a screen and that each time they saw a word they had to think 
about something that had already happened or something 
that was going to happen that was related to that word. The 
experimenter then gave two examples and also demonstrated 
the ratings that had to be made. The word “ball” came on 
the screen, and the experimenter described an event s/he had 
participated in that involved playing in a netball competition 
and losing a game when the other team scored late in the 
game. This event was described as “a bit annoying” by the 
experimenter, because valence was one of the event prop-
erties to be reported. The experimenter then said “This is 
something that has already happened, so I need to touch the 
Past button.” Getting participants to explicitly report whether 
the event was in the past or future functioned to prepare 
them for making similar judgments in the mind-wandering 
task. The experimenter then showed participants the speed 
of retrieval scale and explained it to them as a way of report-
ing how quickly something came to mind. The experimenter 
selected the tortoise button to match the speed at which the 
netball event was retrieved. The clarity scale appeared on the 
next display, and the experimenter explained that this could 
be used to report how clearly the event looked in your head, 
selecting the fourth picture on the scale for the netball event. 
Finally, the emotion scale appeared, and the experimenter 
chose the third face from the left (“a bit sad”). After this 
initial demonstration, a second word appeared on the screen, 
the word “cake”. The experimenter then described an event 
that was going to happen next week, which was a party for 
Fig. 1  a–d Temporal focus, 
speed, clarity and emotion test 
questions as presented to par-
ticipants in the word cue task
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his/her mother for which s/he was going to bake her favorite 
chocolate cake, and then moved through the screens report-
ing on this event, pressing the “future” button on the first 
display. Before moving on to the task itself, descriptions of 
each of the scales were reiterated.
Following this introduction and demonstration, partici-
pants completed the task themselves. In each of ten trials, 
a cue word appeared on the screen (the experimenter read 
the word aloud for children) and participants described 
either an event that had happened or that was going to hap-
pen “just one time”. If participants described a repeated or 
ongoing event, they were reminded that the experimenter 
wanted them to talk about an event that had happened or was 
going to happen just one time. Participants then made the 
speed, clarity, and emotion judgments for each event before 
moving on to the next cue. Cue words were all nouns; the 
words that were selected all had neutral or mildly positive 
emotional significance, an age of acquisition rating between 
one and four years, and were of high frequency in the Brit-
ish National Corpus (https ://corpu s.byu.edu/bnc/). The cues 
were presented in a randomized order and included the fol-
lowing words: book, game, pet, song, friend, bicycle, family, 
rain, winter, and park.
Mind‑wandering task
The instructions for the task were displayed in a series of 
displays as narrated by a cartoon owl. Participants were told 
that they were going to do some coloring-in, and that every 
now and again a question would appear on the screen and 
they would hear a “ding” sound. They were told that the 
question would ask them what they were thinking about, and 
shown an example of the question screen, which contained 
three boxes arranged horizontally, with a box for “past” on 
the left, “now” in the middle, and “future” on the right (see 
Fig. 2). The experimenter explained that when they heard the 
ding, they would have to choose one of the boxes to report 
what they were thinking about, although they would not 
actually have to describe the contents of their thoughts. The 
experimenter then demonstrated the task by starting to color 
in. After 45 s s/he was prompted by the question, stated that 
s/he was thinking about buying a pair of red shoes recently, 
and pressed the “past” button; after a further 45 s s/he was 
prompted again, briefly described thinking about a future 
event of going for a walk and deciding whether to take an 
umbrella, and then pressed the “future” button. Participants 
then began the task themselves; the experimenter moved to 
a different part of the lab to leave participants seated alone 
at the table. Participants colored in for 12 min and during 
this time they were prompted six times (once every 2 min) 
to report on what they were thinking about.
Digit span
Participants first completed the forward digit span followed 
by the backward digit span. In the forward digit span, par-
ticipants were asked to listen to and repeat a sequence of 
numbers read aloud by the experimenter. In the backward 
digit span, participants were asked to repeat each sequence 
in reverse order. Performance was recorded on paper scoring 
sheets in real-time by the experimenter. Testing was discon-
tinued after two incorrect responses to stimuli of the same 
length.
Results
Word cue task
For the purpose of analysis, responses on each of the scales 
were coded as follows: speed of retrieval was coded from 1 
to 3, with 1 = slow, 2 = in between, and 3 = fast; clarity was 
coded from 1 to 6, with 1 = completely unclear and 6 = very 
clear; emotion was coded 1–7, with 1 = really really sad and 
7 = really really happy.
Twelve participants did not give a response to all 10 
cue words: 8 of the 6- to 7-year-olds (20%), 3 of the 9- to 
10-year-olds (10%), and 1 of the adolescents (4%). The 
majority (8/12) of these participants responded to 9 out of 
10 cues, and the lowest number of cues responded to was 6. 
Only data for the cues for which these participants produced 
a response were included in the analyses.
The first analyses examined the proportion of the 
described events that were from the past versus the future. 
Figure 3 shows these data as a function of age group. It 
can be seen from the figure that the majority of responses 
for all age groups were descriptions of past events, and the 
proportion of past events does not seem to vary by age. A 
one-way ANOVA on the proportion of events that were 
from the past with a between-subjects factor of age (four 
levels) found no significant effect of age, F(3, 127) = 2.26, 
p = .09, ηp2 = 0.05. Because of the relatively low numbers 
of future events described in all groups, we also examined 
the proportions of participants in each group who produced 
Fig. 2  Test question as presented to participants in the mind-wander-
ing task
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no future event descriptions at all; 14 (35%) of 6- to-7-year-
olds, four (13%) 9- to-10-year-olds, two (9%) 14- to-15-year-
old, and 3 (8%) adults never produced descriptions of future 
events; chi-squared analyses showed that the proportion of 
participants who produced no future events varied by age 
group, χ2 (3, N = 131) = 12.40, p < .01. A greater propor-
tion of 6- to 7-year-olds produced no future events than of 
either 9- to 10-year-olds, χ2 (1, N = 71) = 4.51, p = .03, 14- to 
15-year-olds, χ2 (1, N = 63) = 5.33, p = .02, or adults, χ2 (1, 
N = 77) = 8.08, p < .01. There was no significant difference 
between the three older age groups in the proportion of par-
ticipants who produced no future events (all p values > 0.1).
In subsequent analyses, we looked at the other meas-
ures in this task as a function of temporal focus and age 
group; these analyses excluded participants who did not 
describe any future events. Figure  4 shows the average 
speed of retrieval ratings for each age group and event 
type. A mixed ANOVA found no main effect of temporal 
focus, F(1, 104) = 1.51, p = .22, ηp2 = 0.01, however, there 
was an interaction between temporal focus and age group, 
F(3, 104) = 3.95, p = .01, ηp2 = 0.10. The interaction was 
explored with four paired samples t tests. Future episodes 
were judged as coming to mind quicker than past episodes 
in the adult group, t(33) = 2.79, p < .01. There was a mar-
ginal effect in the same direction for the adolescent group, 
t(20) = 2.03, p = .06. There was no difference between past 
and future speed estimates for either of the child groups (p 
values > 0.1). Figure 5 shows the average clarity ratings; a 
mixed ANOVA found a significant main effect of temporal 
focus only, F(1, 104) = 12.26, p < .01, ηp2 = 0.11, with past 
events reported as being clearer in the mind (M = 4.60) than 
future events (M = 4.15). Finally, Fig. 6 shows the average 
emotion ratings; it can be seen from the figure that all age 
groups seem to report future events that are rated as more 
positively valenced than past events. ANOVA confirmed this 
pattern, showing a main effect of temporal focus only, F(1, 
104) = 25.49, p < .01, ηp2 = 0.20.
Mind‑wandering task
Figure 7 shows the proportion of times over the six probes 
that participants reported thinking about the past, now, or the 
future; two further participants (one of the 6- to 7-year-olds 
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and one of the adults) were excluded from this analysis 
because they did not provide responses to all six probes. 
Unlike in the word cue task, few participants of any age 
reported no future thoughts at all (4 of the 6- to 7-year-olds, 
2 of the 9- to 10-year-olds, 3 of the adolescents and 1 of the 
adults). In the analyses, we will classify thoughts about the 
past and the future as mind-wandering episodes, and assume 
that thoughts about the here-and-now are task-focused. A 
one-way ANOVA on the absolute number of times (0–6) 
participants reporting thinking about the here-and-now 
showed no significant effect of age, F(3, 124) = 1.04, p = .38, 
indicating that there was no developmental change in the 
likelihood that participants were task-focused. To examine 
mind-wandering, an ANOVA was then conducted on abso-
lute numbers of thoughts with a between-subjects factor of 
group and a within-subjects factor of temporal focus (two 
levels, past or future). There was a main effect of temporal 
focus, F(1, 124) = 10.92, p < .01, ηp2 = 0.08, with a greater 
number of future (M = 2.38) than past (M = 1.84) thoughts 
reported, and an interaction between age group and tempo-
ral focus, F(3, 124) = 5.19, p < .01, η2 = 0.11. Subsequent 
paired t tests showed that only the adult group produced 
more future than past thoughts, t(34) = 5.56, p < .001. One-
way ANOVAs showed that the effect of age on the number 
of future thoughts reported did not reach significance, F(3, 
124) = 2.54, p = .06, but there was a significant effect of age 
on the number of past thoughts reported, F(3, 124) = 5.30, 
p < .01, with post hoc tests showing that the adults produced 
significantly fewer past thoughts than either the 6- to 7-year-
olds or the 9- to 10-year-olds, both ps < 0.05.
A final analysis examined whether there was a develop-
mental change in the percentage of mind-wandering epi-
sodes that were to the future (i.e., the percentage of times 
that when participants reported thinking about other than 
the here-and-now, they were thinking about the future rather 
than the past; one participant always reported thinking about 
the here-and-now, and so was not included in this analysis). 
A one-way ANOVA found a significant effect of age, F(3, 
125) = 6.43, p < .01, with post hoc Tukey tests showing that 
the adult group reported a higher percentage of mind-wan-
dering episodes to the future than all of the other groups (all 
ps < 0.05), who did not differ from each other.
Digit span
An ANOVA on scores on the digit span task with a between-
subjects factor age group and a within-subjects factor of 
direction (forward versus backward) revealed a main effect 
of age, F(3, 128) = 24.18, p < .01, ηp2 = 0.36, and direction, 
F(1, 128) = 189.65, p < .01, ηp2 = 0.60, but no significant 
interaction between age and direction. Post hoc Tukey tests 
revealed that average digit span (the average of forward plus 
backward) of 9- to 10-year-olds was significantly greater 
than of 6- to 7-year-olds. Average digit span of 14- to 
15-year-olds was significantly greater than of 6- to 7-year-
olds and 9- to 10-year-olds. There was no significant dif-
ference between adults’ total digit span and that of 14- to 
15-year-olds.
Relationship between measures
The final analyses examined the correlations between meas-
ures. We examined, for the sample as a whole, whether there 
were correlations between the percentage of mind-wander-
ing episodes that were future-oriented, the overall number 
of mind-wandering reports (summed across past and future), 
the proportion of future events described in the word cue 
task, and digit span performance. None of the correlations 
were significant (all p values > 0.1).
Discussion
Our results provide some initial support for the possibil-
ity that future-oriented bias increases developmentally, but 
this support is not unequivocal. In the mind-wandering task, 
adults showed the typical pattern of reporting more future 
than past mind-wandering episodes, but we did not find this 
pattern in any of our other age groups, including the ado-
lescents. In the word cue task, over a third of the youngest 
age group provided no descriptions of future events at all, a 
significantly higher proportion than in any other age group. 
However, there was no evidence of a developmental change 
in the average numbers of future events described in the 
word cue task; indeed, in all age groups including adults, 
the majority (around 80%) of participants’ event descriptions 
were of past events.
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Mind‑wandering findings
Our mind-wandering task was somewhat unusual, in that, for 
the reasons described in the introduction, mind-wandering 
was assessed during a task that primarily involved motor 
skills rather than higher-level cognitive abilities. Under 
these sorts of circumstances, it would be expected that a 
future-oriented bias would be particularly large in adults, 
and indeed they reported around twice as many episodes of 
future-oriented mind-wandering than past-oriented mind-
wandering. Strikingly, though, we did not see this pattern 
in any of our other groups. Although the overall number 
of times that participants reported future thoughts did not 
change developmentally, there was a developmental change 
in the percentage of mind-wandering episodes that were 
future-oriented relative to those that were past-oriented. 
Notably, the age pattern that we observed could not be 
explained by the differential availability of working mem-
ory resources in the groups; we found no relation between 
the percentage of mind-wandering reports that were future-
oriented and working memory capacity, unlike Baird et al. 
(2011), but replicating the findings of McVay et al. (2013) 
and Robison and Unsworth (2017).
Our findings are the first to suggest that there are develop-
mental changes in future-oriented bias in mind-wandering. 
However, the fact that none of the age groups other than 
adults showed a future-oriented bias stands in contrast to 
the findings of Ye et al. (2014) and Zhang et al. (2015), 
who both found that children of around 11 years reported 
more future- than past-oriented thoughts in mind-wandering. 
We note that these previous studies did not include an adult 
group, and it could be the case that the future-oriented bias 
they reported would have been even more marked in adults. 
Our task resembled that of Ye et al. (2014) in terms of the 
approximate length of time of the session, the number of 
times participants were probed regarding mind-wandering, 
the way mind-wandering was probed, and the use of three 
categories in self-report of thought content. Thus, we sus-
pect that the difference in findings may be a result of the use 
of different primary tasks (choice reaction time in Ye et al.’s 
study versus the coloring-in task).
Such an explanation, though, is at odds with the idea 
that levels of future-oriented mind-wandering decrease as 
a function of the extent to which the primary task recruits 
working memory (Smallwood et al., 2009), because the main 
demands of our task were on motor rather than cognitive 
skills and thus we might have expected to see more future-
oriented mind-wandering in our task compared to those of 
Ye et al. and Zhang et al. A more speculative explanation 
is that our findings reflect cultural differences between the 
samples (a sample from the UK versus samples from China), 
although we are aware of no cross-cultural evidence that 
would support such an explanation, and indeed it has been 
argued that Chinese culture is generally less rather than 
more future-focused than Western cultures (Guo, Ji, Spina, 
& Zhang, 2012). In any case, the contrast between our find-
ings and those of Ye et al. (2014) and Zhang et al. (2015) 
mean that we do not want to claim that children (or adoles-
cents) will always lack future-oriented bias during mind-
wandering, and that such a bias only emerges in adulthood. 
Rather, the degree of such a bias might be task-dependent; 
our findings provide evidence that it may emerge develop-
mentally but further studies need to examine whether this is 
also the case in the context of other primary tasks.
One final possible explanation of our failure to find a 
future-oriented bias in our child groups is that participants 
failed to understand the task and simply responded at ran-
dom. While we did include an experimenter demonstration 
of the task (in response to the auditory prompt, the experi-
menter verbally reported two mind-wandering episodes and 
pressed the appropriate buttons), we did not ask participants 
to describe the contents of their mental states, making it 
impossible to be completely sure that their self-reports 
accurately reflected the temporal focus of their thoughts. 
However, we believe it is unlikely that the data could be 
explained by failure to understand the task. First, children 
had already been trained to report on the temporal focus 
of their thoughts (past versus future) in the word cue task, 
and were able to do this accurately (in the word cue task, 
participants did verbally describe a past or future event). 
This is consistent with other studies that indicate that by 
6–7-year-old children can reliably report on the deictic status 
of events (Tillman, Marghetis, Barner, & Srinivasan, 2017). 
Second, it seems implausible that adolescents would fail to 
understand the task instructions, and this group resembled 
the youngest group in not showing a future-oriented bias 
in mind-wandering. However, to be completely confident 
that participants really are following task instructions, 
future studies could potentially ask participants to verbally 
describe their thoughts in response to the mind-wandering 
probe. We assume that studies of mind-wandering typically 
do not do so because it is undesirable for participants to 
switch their attention away from the primary task for long 
periods of time (thus, mind-wandering reports are designed 
to be brief). Nevertheless, for the purposes of checking par-
ticipants’ compliance with task instructions, selected probe 
trials could be used.
Word cue task: temporal focus
In the word cue task, we found no evidence of a significant 
developmental increase in the proportion of times par-
ticipants produced descriptions of future events, although 
a greater proportion of the youngest children never pro-
duced any descriptions of future events than in the other 
groups. As inspection of the error bars in Fig. 3 shows, 
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the youngest group produced noisier data in this task. One 
possibility that needs to be considered, as in the case of the 
mind-wandering task, is that this youngest group may have 
failed to understand task instructions. We can be confident 
that children could appropriately report on the temporal 
orientation of their thoughts because they provided tensed 
verbal descriptions. However, it is possible that some 
children did not realize that they could produce future as 
well as past event descriptions, despite the experimenter 
modelling the task by providing descriptions of both past 
and future events. We believe that this is unlikely because 
participants were explicitly asked to report for every event 
whether it was in the past or the future, meaning that they 
were highly likely to be aware that either option was pos-
sible. In any case, it is worth noting that the data on the 
temporal focus of described episodes show a similar devel-
opmental pattern (i.e., no significant change in the propor-
tion of future events reported) regardless of whether we 
exclude participants from the analyses who never produced 
any future descriptions.
The fact that in the word cue task participants of all age 
groups produced descriptions of past events around 80% of 
the time when given a free choice between describing past 
and future events is consistent with the suggestion, seen in 
the literature on mind-wandering, that verbal cues are more 
likely to trigger thoughts about the past than thoughts about 
the future (Plimpton et al., 2015; Vannucci et al., 2017). We 
now consider why past event descriptions might have been 
so dominant in this task, even for adults.
Theorists have argued for the distinction between direct 
and generative modes of production for both episodic memo-
ries and episodic future thoughts, with the suggestion being 
that the direct mode occurs automatically and rapidly in 
response to a cue, whereas the generative mode is slower 
and involves effortful constructive processes (Anderson, 
Dewhurst, & Dean, 2017; Jeunehomme & D’Argembeau, 
2016; Uzer & Brown, 2017; Uzer, Lee, & Brown, 2012). 
Recent research with adults indicates that the direct mode 
is responsible for around about 60% of responses in cued 
episodic thinking tasks, at least when the cues are object 
words (Jeunehomme & D’Argembeau, 2016; Uzer et al., 
2012). Because, unlike in other studies, participants were 
free to describe either past or future events, it is plausible 
that they may have relied even more on the direct mode in 
our task. If it is assumed (at least for adults) that the majority 
of event descriptions result from the direct mode in the word 
cue task, one interesting question is why past events “win 
out” over future events. One possibility is that even for the 
direct mode past events are more accessible and retrieved 
more quickly than future events. However, Jeunehomme 
and D’Argembeau (2016) found that this was not the case, 
and even found some evidence that for the generative mode, 
descriptions of future events are produced more quickly 
than those of past events (although they measured retrieval 
speed in tasks that separately probed episodic past and future 
thinking). In our self-report measure, we also found that 
participants in all age groups did not report taking longer 
to bring future events to mind than past events, and indeed 
adolescents and adults reported that future events came to 
mind more quickly.
The fact that participants produced more past than future 
event descriptions could be seen as consistent with what 
Jeunehomme and D’Argembeau (2016) term the “recasting” 
hypothesis: that in cueing tasks assessing episodic future 
thinking, participants will often initially retrieve a memory 
of a past event, which they then simply “recast” as a descrip-
tion of a future episode. If this is indeed the case, then it 
would not be surprising to see participants producing more 
past than future event descriptions in our task, because the 
starting point for producing a future event description would 
often be an episodic memory of a past event: in our task 
participants could simply describe the past episode because 
there is nothing to be gained by recasting it as a future one. 
However, given existing findings, we believe it is unlikely 
that the recasting hypothesis is correct, i.e., that partici-
pants often simply re-describe a past episode as a future 
one (Addis, Pan, Vu, Laiser, & Schacter, 2009; Jeunehomme 
& D’Argembeau, 2016; though see Gamboz et al., 2010). As 
things stand, further studies are necessary to figure out why 
participants show such a marked tendency to produce past 
event descriptions on our task.
Although our data do not allow us to reach a conclusion 
as to why participants produce primarily descriptions of past 
events, we speculate that the proportion of past to future 
event descriptions may well be malleable as a function of 
cue type. Inspection of our own data suggests that even for 
specific cue words there was variability in how often future 
event descriptions were produced: e.g., the cue words “rain” 
and “bicycle” led to future event descriptions less than 10% 
of the time, whereas future event descriptions were given 
more than 20% of the time for the cue words “winter”, “fam-
ily”, and “friends”. While these differences are not large, we 
suspect that in line with theoretical accounts of the func-
tion of episodic future thinking (Atance & O’Neill, 2001; 
Szpunar, Addis, McLelland, & Schacter, 2013), participants 
might be more likely to generate episodic future thoughts 
when the cues in question link with their existing goals and 
plans. Thus, future studies could use our paradigm and sys-
tematically manipulate the nature of the cues to examine 
the malleability of the tendency to produce episodic past 
over future event descriptions that we have reported here. 
Of additional interest would be whether this malleability 
varies developmentally; it is possible that for younger groups 
of children it may remain difficult to elicit episodic future 
thinking in such a task.
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We now turn to considering the developmental find-
ings on the other measures in the word cue task. Unlike in 
Coughlin et al.’s (2014) study, we did not find that children 
reported that future events took longer to come to mind than 
past events; this may reflect the nature of our task in which 
participants were not obliged to focus on a single time period 
and thus could report whichever type of event came first 
to mind. However, we did find a developmental shift, with 
adults (and to some extent adolescents) reporting that future 
events came to mind more rather than less quickly than past 
events. We note Coughlin et al.’s findings with adults were in 
the same direction. Finally, we found effects of time period 
on both clarity ratings (past events rated as more clearly 
envisaged than future events) and emotion ratings (future 
events were more positively rated than past events) that 
did not interact with age group. These findings are consist-
ent with the existing adult literature which indicates that 
episodic memories tend to be reported as more vivid than 
imagined future events. With regard to emotion ratings, our 
findings provide new evidence that the future positivity bias 
is robust; it is present even in young children, and does not 
change in magnitude developmentally.
Finally, we consider the findings regarding the lack of 
relations between measures. Perhaps most surprisingly, we 
found no relation between the likelihood that participants 
produced future event descriptions in the word cue task and 
the likelihood that they made future-oriented reports when 
mind-wandering. In the mind-wandering literature, the ten-
dency to produce future-oriented reports has been seen to 
be reflective of individual differences in working memory 
and has also been shown to be affected by mood and by 
depression (Baird et al., 2011; Hoffmann, Banzhaf, Kanske, 
Bermpohl, Singer, 2016; Smallwood et al., 2009; Smallwood 
& O’Connor, 2011). As we have already emphasized, we 
found no evidence of a relation between working memory 
and the tendency to produce future-oriented thoughts in 
either of our tasks. The lack of a relation between levels of 
future-oriented thinking across the two tasks suggests that 
future-oriented thinking may employ different processes 
across the two tasks, and moreover, that it may not make 
sense to talk about individual or group differences in the 
likelihood of engaging in future-oriented thought without 
specifying task context.
Summary and conclusions
The aim of our study was to examine whether there were 
developmental changes in future-oriented bias. The findings 
do not straightforwardly support the idea that there are siz-
able developmental changes in such bias across the board. 
There were no developmental changes, even over a wide 
age-range, in the probability that participants produced a 
future rather than past event description in the word cue 
task, and similarly there were no developmental changes 
in the number of times that participants reported thinking 
about the future in the mind-wandering task. On these spe-
cific measures, there is no evidence of developmental change 
over even a very wide age-range. The lack of developmental 
change on the word cue task in particular suggests that the 
tendency to generate information about the past rather than 
the future in response to external cues is a very robust one 
that reflects a basic property of how information is retrieved 
from the systems involved in episodic thinking.
The lack of a developmental change in the number of 
times that participants report future thoughts in the mind-
wandering task makes it difficult to argue that the future is 
not salient for younger age groups. Nevertheless, we did find 
some developmental changes in both our tasks. More than 
a third of our youngest groups never produced any future 
event descriptions in the word cue task, a significantly higher 
proportion than in any other group, indicating that some 
younger children find it particularly difficult to produce 
future event descriptions. Moreover, in the mind-wander-
ing task, unlike with adults, a future-oriented bias (thinking 
more about the future relative to the past when mind-wan-
dering) was not found in the child/adolescent groups. Thus, 
our findings suggest that in the context of spontaneously 
produced thoughts about other times, the future is less domi-
nant than the past in the minds of children and adolescents 
than adults. Taken together, these findings indicate that there 
are some developmental changes in future thinking, and that 
even adolescents may not resemble adults in the degree to 
which they focus on the future relative to the past.
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